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ALBERT THE GREAT AND
THE HIERARCHY OF SCIENCES
Mark D. Jordan

The paper follows Albert through three of his discussions of the hierarchy of
sciences. The first discussion presents what seems a straightforward account
of Aristotle's trichotomy of speculative sciences. It remains unsatisfying so
far as it exacerbates tensions latent in Aristotle. In the second discussion,
Albert attempts to resolve these tensions by supplying a narrative of the
mind's ascent along the hierarchy. But the narrative fails to describe convincingly the power by which the mind is rendered capable of ascending. The
description is provided finally by the third discussion. In it, Albert identifies
the topmost science as rhetorical theology that wants to persuade its students
to advance towards God in faith. By completing the narrative in this way,
Albert suggests that any adequate discussion of the hierarchy of sciences will
not be a contextless description, but a rhetorically situated exhortation.

The topic of the "hierarchy of the sciences" is a knot of teachings and questions handed down to medieval Latin philosophy by various ancient and
patristic texts. I For modern readers, the knot is tied most obviously by Plato
in Republic 6 and 7. There the Platonic Socrates considers together the soul's
powers, their objects, languages for describing them, their conversion by
philosophy, and their perfection in the education of future rulers. The Republic was not available to medieval Latin readers, of course. They had to learn
of the topic from Plato's successors. Early medieval readers could discover
one succession in Boethius on Aristotle, but others were available in
Augustine's retelling of Stoic and neo-Platonic philosophy, in Seneca and
Cicero, in the encyclopedias of Martianus Capella and Isidore, and in the
mystagogical treatises of Ps-Dionysius. By the thirteenth century, there were
added to these texts not only Aristotle's several accounts of the hierarchy, but
variations on them and on Plato by Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes.
The Platonic knot of teachings and questions is handed to an author like
Albert the Great, then, loosened in some parts and tightened in others. It had
been loosened so far as the Aristotelian tradition succeeded in extracting
issues for discussion and in providing a technical vocabulary for them. Albert
did not need to approach the topic unaided. But the knot had been tightened
so far as Christian and then Islamic authors extended the hierarchy of sciences
to include theologies derived from revelation. The questions and teachings
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surrounding the hierarchy of sciences became the privileged topic for reflecting on the relation of Christian theology to philosophy understood as the best
of human learning.
It is worth hearing Albert's reflections on the topic for several reasons.
First, he was at once the boldest and most assiduous Latin commentator on
Aristotle of the thirteenth century-a century not lacking in thoughtful commentators. Second, Albert was justly renowned among his contemporaries for
having mastered so many sciences. 2 If anyone had traversed the hierarchy in
its details, he had. Finally, Albert understood himself to be first and last a
Dominican teacher of theology. Thus his interest in the hiearchy of sciences,
whatever else it might be, is certainly evangelical. If nothing else, the public
conditions of Albert's authorship require that he address the role of revealed
theology among the other sciences. What better author, then, in whom to try
to untie some of the doctrines and questions?
Albert discusses the hierarchy of the sciences most directly and most consecutively in his paraphrases of Aristotle. He also treats of it in other passages, of course. Some appear predictably, say as attached to passages on
knowledge in commentaries on the Dionysian corpus. 3 Other appearances are
more surprising. Albert not only mastered the digression as a teaching device,
he had a theory to justify its use. 4 A complete list of Albert's scattered remarks
on the hierarchy of sciences would be difficult both to compile and to exploit
intelligently. I have chosen instead to concentrate on three texts, which together span more than two decades of Albert's thinking. I begin with the
paraphrase of the Physics Uust before 1250), move next to the short treatise
011 the Intellect alld the Intelligible (between 1254-1257 and 1260), and
conclude with the Summa theologiae (finished after 1274). My argument will
be that the three texts not only take up different threads of the topic, but that
they show Albert making progress in appreciating how tangled they are.
Some preliminary cautions need to be noted before reading the first texts,
the two Aristotelian paraphrases. The paraphrases enact a single project, to
make all the parts of philosophy intelligible to the Latins. 5 The chronology
of the paraphrases has been fairly well worked out by Weisheipl,6 but their
relation to the rest of Albert's corpus has not. At several points in the text,
Albert disclaims the teaching of the paraphrases. They are to be read, he
insists, not as expressions of his own mind, but as expositions of the sense
of Aristotle. 7 Yet the paraphrases range widely in their choice of topics and
interlocutors, and Albert frequently interrupts the plain reading of Aristotle
to indulge controversy or to offer erudition.
The contrast with Aquinas's "commentaries" on Aristotle is striking. While
Aquinas enters no explicit disclaimers, he does in fact restrict himself to the
Aristotelian text and so rarely speaks in his own voice. It is a rule for the
careful reading of Thomas, then, that passages from expositions cannot be
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mixed indiscriminately with passages from works written in his own voice.
Is the same rule to be applied to Albert's paraphrases? I think not. What the
Albertine paraphrases have to say on the hierarchy of sciences is clearly
intended to be more than a simple reading of Aristotle. The paraphrases want
to remake an idealized Aristotelian corpus into a comprehensive presentation
of philosophy. Albert promises as much in the Physics and then fulfills the
promise abundantly, especially in a treatise like On the Intellect.

1. Orders of Abstraction and Learning
The opening treatise of Albert's paraphrase of the Physics is a prologue to
the study of Aristotelian science. It begins by enunciating Aristotle's di vision
of speculative knowledge into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. 8 First
in the order of nature is metaphysics or "theology," the universal science that
treats being (ens) so far as it is being, conceived entirely without motion or
sensible matter. Next comes mathematics, which conceives its objects "with
motion and sensible matter according to [their] manner of existing (esse), but
not according to the account (ratio) [to be given of them]."9 The lowest
science is physics, which conceives its objects with motion and sensible
matter both according to their manner of existing and according to the account
given of them. As preliminary examples of objects appropriate to the three
sciences, Albert mentions substance for metaphysics, a Euclidean circle or
line for mathematics, and the heavens, an element, or something compounded
out of elements for physics. For the last, he adds a distinction between physical and logical definitions. Natural things must be defined in physics by
reference to sensible matter and a concrete subject; a definition merely in
terms of common notions of genus and difference, understood as simple and
uni versal, would belong to logic. They are useless to physics. IO
Once he has set out the basic scheme of the trichotomy of sciences, Albert
begins to augment it. 11 He augments it first by glossing the objects of the
three sciences. Thus metaphysics treats only the intelligible; mathematics,
the intelligible and imaginable; physics, the intelligible, imaginable, and sensible. 12 Again, each of the sciences corresponds to an understanding of body.13
Metaphysics considers body simply and without qualification, retracing it to
being. Mathematics considers "intelligible matter" or "imaginable quantity"
according to the various figures found in it. 14 Physics or natural philosophy
as such considers natural body universally, while its branches take up one or
another kind of physical body. The sub-division of physics makes clear that
it is a "general" science, that is, a group or cluster of particular sciences. So
too is mathematics. Metaphysics is the universal science, but for that very
reason cannot be sub-divided into fields.
Albert augments the trichotomy of sciences more interestingly by drawing
out its implications for teaching or inquiry. He begins by remarking that the
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objects of metaphysics are the causes of the objects of mathematics and
physics. Thus the principles of mathematics and physics can be borrowed
from metaphysics, where they are "tested" or "proved" (probata).15 But he
immediately substitutes a model in terms of whole and parts: metaphysics is
the universal science, while the other two are more restricted sciences that
treat "parts" of being. Only metaphysics can be concerned to demonstrate principles properly from a universal grasp of being. 16 The logician can also seek to
establish some version of them by proceeding from the common argumentative
principles of all sciences. Here as elsewhere, the verbal universality of logic
mirrors the real universality of metaphysicsY Logic also teaches that true science proceeds demonstratively from first principles to proximate principles.
Any other procedure is topical, that is, dialectical or rhetorical. 18
Still, the downward flow of causes and principles in the hierarchy must be
reversed so far as human learning is concerned. Our teaching must begin with
what is easier, and what is easier for us is what lies near at hand. Good
teaching begins from what can be grasped most immediately by sense, imagination, or intellect. Moreover, instruction in physics must begin with acquiring certain principles useful in arguing more particular conclusions. Hence
Albert construes the ancient half-title of the Physics, apo phones or ex auditu,
to mean that the principles given in the book are had rather by hearing than
by demonstration. 19
The precept to begin teaching near at hand leads Albert quickly enough to
more interesting inversions of the hierarchy and to more difficult questions
about the interdependence of the sciences. He reads in the Aristotelian text
that every science is concerned with principles, causes, and elements. 2o He
then argues that it is only in physics that one can learn principles, causes,
and elements fully and as such. Even though metaphysics considers all of the
causes, it treats form and matter not as constitutive of things, but as reducible
to the understanding of substance. 21 How can it be that something necessary
to all scientific demonstration is learned fully only in physics? Albert replies
first by saying that principles and causes are known sufficiently in each
science for it to proceed. He then offers an alternate argument that begins by
distinguishing prior axioms (dignitates) from proximate ones.
Sometimes demonstration proceeds from what are first and true, and these
are principles (prillcipia). Sometimes however [it proceeds] from what are
taken on faith (jides) from what are first and true, which [things] however
are not proximate. And sometimes [it proceeds] by what are last and essential
(esselltialia). Therefore what are first and true are the principles. And what
are from the first and true, and accepted further in order to infer other things,
are the causes: since propositions are the cause of the conclusion. And the
elements are proximate, [and] they are required to prove nothing further. 22

Albert fails to draw out this explication at any length, preferring to argue that
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not every science must proceed from principles, causes, and elements in the
same way. But the explication would seem to suggest that the higher sciences
(:an borrow the pedagogy of causes from physics on "faith," that is, as something already learned.
Yet in physics too there is a difference between the order of nature and the
order of our learning. We begin from a confused apprehension of the most
<:ommon things. This apprehension must be analyzed or "divided" in order
for us to discover the special efficient causes and the particular elements of
natural objects. 23 Albert gives two examples. We know the whole circle that
is to be defined before we know the parts of its Euclidean definition. Again,
a child begins by calling all men "father" and all women "mother," and only
then discerns the particular man who is father and the particular woman who
is mother.
Human learning moves through the physical world in much the same wayand so very differently from the demonstrative deductions of metaphysics
and mathematics or even the causal order of nature itself. Albert first distinguishes three, cumulative stages of sense awareness: the apprehension
(acceptio) of a particular sense, the apprehension of the common sense power,
and the apprehension of what he calls "a certain cognition of confused reason."24It is the latter that allows the child to know that his father is this male,
rather than an ass. But before the child can know that this male is father, she
must know that some male is father, and even earlier that a human being can
be a father.25 In other words, the child must begin by apprehending what
Albert calls an indefinite individual (individuum vagum) within a universal
genus. The child starts as it were with the highest genus, substance, and then
works downwards through the Porphyrian tree until the indefiniteness is
resolved into a very specific individual (individuum signatum). Albert repeats
Avicenna's example of recognizing someone at a distance: We first see something (substance), then something moving (animal), then something erect
(human being), and finally something with particular properties (Socrates).
Albert takes this account not only as psychologically plausible, but as reflecting the development of brain physiology. Moreover, and more remarkably for
Albert, this process of composition, which moves from an indistinct simple
thing to a distinct composite thing, is proper to physics and to no other
science.
At the end of the prologue to Aristotelian science, then, Albert's account
of the hierarchy seems to be pulled in several different directions. First, it
has become clear that the order of abstraction is the reverse of the order of
human discovery. We discover by moving from vague abstractions to definite
particulars. Moreover, a similar reversal occurs with regard to principles. The
Aristotelian trichotomy suggests that the principles of every science will be
made secure only at the top of the hierarchy, in metaphysics. But Albert has
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argued explicitly that it is only in physics that the central terms of science
are learned fully. Again, there seems to an inversion of the hierarchy in the
curious relation between metaphysics and logic. Logic seems to offer a verbal
or abstract anticipation of the precepts of metaphysics. Yet logic is preliminary even to physics and so stands at the lowest point of the hierarchy, on
the boundary between the liberal arts and philosophy.
There are technical responses to these reversals and inversions. In paraphrasing the Categories, for example, Albert explores at some length the
questions, whether logic is a distinct study and whether it is a part of phil osophy.26 One could also find passages in which the oppositions of abstraction
and human discovery are addressed. But technical attempts at reducing the
tensions in Albert's account would obscure one of its most interesting lessons.
While the Platonic Line is constructed around a narrative of human learning,
the Aristotelian trichotomy begins as a division of objects and then proceeds
to match them with accomplished bodies of ideal teaching, that is, with
demonstrations. Aristotle's notorious silences in regard to the discovery of
principles or the intuition of essences carryover into the hierarchy of sciences
as omissions of the processes of discovery. When Albert attempts to describe
human learning, he can only exacerbate the tensions of the basic Aristotelian
account. What he must do instead is to begin with the narrative he wants to
tell about the mind's ascent along the hierarchy.

2. Orders of Introspection and Completion
The most original of Albert's treatments of the hierarchy of sciences is On
the Intellect and the Intelligible. He composed it to fill a gap in the parva
naturalia, the shorter Aristotelian essays on biological topics. The gap falls
textually between On Sense and What is Sensed and On Sleep and Wakefulness. Albert argues that there can be no discussion of sleep until there has
been further study of the intellect beyond what has been said in On the Soul
3. 27 So he interposes a short treatise in three parts: on the nature of the
intellect as such (1.1), on the intelligible as it belongs to intellect (1.2), and
on the unity and diversity of the intellect with regard to the intelligibles (1.3).
To this treatise Albert then adds a second book, on the natural completion or
perfection of the intellectual soul. While the topic of the hierarchy of sciences
figures at several points in the first book, the narrative of ascent preoccupies
the second.
The Aristotelian trichotomy of sciences appears first towards the end of
Book 1, in the exposition of the kinds of intelligibles. 28 Albert wants to
compare the objects of the three sciences with the limited power of human
intellection. Metaphysical or theological objects exceed this power; mathematical objects are most proportioned to it; physical objects fall below it in
regard to certainty and firmness because of privation, matter, and motion. 29
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This gradation of intelligibility is reflected in the sequence of demonstration
itself. The principles of demonstration "have much of the light and form of
intellect," but conclusions have less of this light and have it only as an effect.
Thus the habitual possession of principles is given one name, 'intellectus',
while the possession of conclusions takes another, 'scientia'. Reasoning
(ratiocinatio) is the path (decursus) of light from principles to conclusions.
Albert appends to this account a gradation of intellects, that is, a ranking
of different intellectual powers and states. 30 He begins, obviously enough,
with the possible and active intellects of On the Soul 3. Next comes the formal
intellect, which arises when intellectual light produces a form in the soul.
Formal intellect is divided first into practical and speculative. It is next
divided, more importantly, into simple and composite. Simple formal intellect
is "an intelligence of non-complex things." Composite formal intellect is "an
intelligence of complex things" compounded by enunciation, syllogism, or
another form of argument. Composite formal intellect is further divided into
an inborn intellect of principles and an "accomplished" intellect (intellectus
adeptus) acquired by discovery or study.
Now this schema of intellectual powers and states foreshadows the structure of Book 2. Albert expands the schema there by inserting the "effected"
or actualized intellect between the intellect of principles and the accomplished intellect, then by adding an assimilative intellect at the end of the
list. The effected intellect (intellectus in effectu) is intellect actualized by an
abstracted form that has been illuminated by the agent intellect. 31 The assimilative or assimilating intellect "is that in which a human being, so far as is
possible or permitted to him, rises proportionately to the divine intellect. "32
Thus the complete hierarchy of intellects is given by Albert as possible, agent,
formal (or of principles), effected, accomplished, and assimilative or divine. 33
This hierarchy of intellects was known to Albert from several sources, none
of which he took over unmodified. Let me mention two. Alfarabi's brief On
the Intellect and the Intellected describes a sequence of five intellects: in
potency, in effect, accomplished, agent, and divine. 34 The agent intellect
appears at the end of the list because it is, for Alfarabi, a separate form, the
cause of other intellects, and the giver of forms to bodies. It stands one step
below the divine. Albert could hardly accept such a description, and so he
changes both the agent intellect's position in the hierarchy and its attributes.
Consider, as a second source, Avicenna's On the Soul 5.6. The sequence of
intellects is less orderly here, but one does read of a material intellect, an
intellect in effect, an agent intellect, and an accomplished intellect. 35 Avicenna adds to these what he calls "holy intellect," which is the preeminent
virtue of prophecy.36 Albert too will speak of a holy mind, but will do so as
something known to philosophy.
Whatever its sources, what is to be learned from this hierarchy? It serves
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to show several things. First, most simply, Albert can diagnose by it what is
needed for different kinds of minds. 37 Some minds are naturally more attached
to imagination and sense; they are incapable of learning except by sensible
examples. They cannot attain to metaphysics. A second or middle mind is
helped towards understanding by prophetic or divine teaching. A third kind
of mind is born to understand things by itself or with only slight teaching.
This is the philosophic mind, also the mind of the prophet.
Still, second, the hierarchy of intellects permits Albert to explain something
of how human learning is fulfilled in a glimpse of the divine. It is important
to be careful here. Albert emphasizes at the beginning of the second book
that he intends to speak about the degrees by which the intellect rises to
completion, not about its last and highest happiness. 38 The whole discussion
takes place within the ambit of philosophy, not of Christian theology. Yet it
describes the highest condition of assimilative intellect not only as a vision
of the divine, but as a kind of cleansed holiness.
Albert first characterizes assimilative intellect as an ascent to the highest
cause of intelligences and intelligibility. The ascent is possible because the
divine light has made itself manifest at four lower levels of apprehension. 39
It reaches down first to the essential differences of each thing, making them
manifest to lower powers. It is, second, the light in which intelligible forms
have the being of abstraction or separation for the possible intellect, which
is its image (imago). The third manifestation is that in which there appear
universally in the agent intellect truths that come from the light of the inner
microcosm (minor mundus). The divine light is joined to the agent intellect
not as light to darkness or privation or potency, but as one light to another,
if inferior light, which it strengthens and beautifies. The fourth illumination,
the last, is what is manifest in the application of divine light to the intelligences that move the celestial spheres.
Now this account of how the divine mind discloses itself along the steps
of the hierarchy makes clear one thing that was not clear in the Aristotelian
trichotomy. Progress up the levels of intelligibility is progress in self-knowledge. Albert has already stressed that the human mind is an image of the
divine mind, and then drawn the conclusion that our minds' work is to find
themselves amid the distraction of bodies. 40 Albert now prescribes four steps
towards self-discovery.41 They are described both in terms of objects to be
thought and in terms of effects on the mind thinking. The mind is freed from
flesh, from time and extension, from matter, so that it turns more to the divine
and so becomes more itself. Albert's language itself takes on unusual coloring, and he quotes moving passages from Apuleius and Dionysius on the
properties of the mind set free. 42 He is even willing to admit a kind of
philosophic prophecy.43 What he insists on, above all, is that ascent along the
hierarchy of intellects is the human soul coming into knowledge of itself-of

THE HIERARCHY OF SCIENCES

491

its descent from the divine, of its role as pedagogue in rationalizing the bodily
world, of its own immortality.44 The teaching here is not a slip or a simple
excess. Albert will say many of the same things near the end of the series of
paraphrases in 011 the Nature alld Origin of the SoulY
Still the lyrical ending of On the Intellect, or the exemplary stories in the
later work, cannot dispel doubts that Albert has not been true to his claim
that he would speak only of philosophical matters. It is certainly true that
Albert has philosophical sources in which contemplations and mystical purifications are discussed. But it is equally true that he cannot appropriate these
sources as they stand. For a Christian theologian, the agency of ascent to the
divine is not simply a diffuse illumination. It is a gift of grace announced and
accomplished through a specific revelation. So what Albert has gained in
providing a narrative of ascent, he must now secure by naming the power
that makes ascent possible.

3. Orders of Persuasion to Piety
The Summa theologiae was certainly the last of Albert's major works to be
finished, and the main part of it was probably composed after the Aristotelian
paraphrases. 46 It begins, by well established tradition, with a prologue and
disputed questions on theology as science. The prologue folIows one of the
fixed patterns for an accessus or introduction: a Scriptural verse (prothema)
is dissected phrase by phrase to uncover the outline of a doctrine about
revealed theology.47 The disputed questions raised by Albert after the prologue are also traditional, though his way of arranging them and subordinating them to one another seems original. Still, and however cliched the forms
of his Summa, Albert's teaching in it on the relation of theology to the other
sciences is both personal and deliberate. It is also a necessary supplement to
the teaching of the Aristotle paraphrases.
The prothema for Albert's prologue is Psalm 138, verse 6. He reads it as
proclaiming that theology is higher than all the other sciences in six ways:
in honor or nobility, in origin, in trustworthiness, in applicability, in demonstrative force, and in the infinity of its object. 48 Each of the six points is
explicated by reference to philosophical teaching and to Scripture. So, for
the first point, Albert reminds the reader of Aristotle's remarks in On the Soul
about the wondrousness of knowing about soul. Theology is more wonderful,
more honorable, and more noble. On the second point, again, Albert juxtaposes Alfarabi with Scripture and Augustine to argue that only theology seals
the soul with divinity itself.
What is more striking, Albert uses the third heading to assert that theology is
the only true science. 49 He argues that even if the other sciences deal with
immobile intelligibilities, they still learn of them by reflecting on moving creatures. Only theology is grounded in the eternal rationes, completely removed
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from motion. Thus only theology completely or chiefly fulfills the requirement
that science be a stable knowledge drawn from intelligible things. Indeed, theology is appropriately said to be God's science in each of the four orders of
causality. God is the formal cause of every knowable and knower, and God is
the efficient cause of theology by the action of the Holy Spirit. Again, God is
the subject-matter with which the science is concerned. Finally, most importantly,
God is the end towards which theology aims. It follows that theology is most
truly wisdom because it is desired for its own sake without qualification.
The claim that the science of the divine is the goal of knowing is reiterated
under the fourth heading,50 but it receives its most important exposition in
the questions of the treatise that follow the prologue. In the treatise Albert
resolves a number of difficulties about the scientific character of theology by
explaining that it is "a science according to piety (scientia secundum
pietatem). "51 The phrase is a variation on the Vulgate of Titus 1: 1, "according
to ... the apprehension of truth which is according to piety (secundum ... agnitionem veritatis quae secundum pietatem est)." Albert invokes the
phrase to describe a knowledge that instructs faith in the merit of certain
deeds. This explicitly rhetorical knolwedge wants to persuade its students to
love what they should do. It undertakes to persuade by narrating particular
events and showing the actions of particular persons. 52 It does so because its
unrestricted audience contains many who can learn only by means of particulars, which function for them as "universals in potency. "53
In saying this much, Albert has not by any means exhausted the phrase
from Titus. Indeed, he gives it central importance in the treatise by connecting
it to two other doctrines. The first of these doctrines is Augustine's division
of things into what signifies (signum), what is to be used (uti), what is to be
enjoyed (jrui) , and what both uses and enjoys.54 Albert extracts from this
division the teaching that theology is a unified and separate science just so
far as it attends to signs and other useful things as means to the enjoyable. 55
The second doctrine invoked by Albert asserts that the manner of theology,
as exemplified in Scripture, ought to be multiply persuasive. Theology must
then employ, not only the styles of affective rhetoric,56 but even the devices
of the poetsY Thus Albert draws out from the Pauline phrase a description
of theology as a hortatory knowledge of what can lead to salvation, that is,
to the enjoyment of God.
The two doctrines are properly joined for Albert because he holds that any
responsible teaching about our highest end would have to try to move us
towards it. He has in mind Aristotelian notions about the obligations of ethical
discourse. So Albert notices Aristotle's concern for the limits on persuasion
by mere argument for many hearers. 58 They must be taught, not by arguments,
by by love or coercion. Indeed, because virtue is difficult for us, we need as
many inducements to it as we can find, whether they are coercive or instruc-
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tive. 59 But Albert's tenet about the persuasive character of theology also
derives, and more importantly, from the view that all knowledge, speculative
or practical, is ordered to human fulfillment in the vision of God.
The best known source for this view is Ps-Dionysius, who figures prominently in the first treatise of the Summa. Albert relies particularly on the
Dionysian assertion that the poetic devices of Scripture are so many "coverings" (integumenta) or "veils" (velamina).60 But Albert knows well that the
assertion reaches beyond the text of Scripture to describe every creature and
every science about creatures. Human sciences lead their learners by the hand
through progressively less material images until they are able to contemplate
what is immateria1. 61 The language of Scripture-which is to say, the manner
of theology-recapitulates the pedagogy of the whole hierarchy of sciences.
The artful persuasions used in theology make explicit the teleology that
underlies the Aristotelian trichotomy of speculative sciences. The Aristotelian
trichotomy turns out, once again, to be a small and somewhat misleading
segment of a much larger and more various hierarchy crowned by Scripture.
Albert makes his revaluation clear in a remarkable passage at the end of
his discussion of theology. The passage is in the form of an objection, the
body of which Albert both confirms and then underscores. 62 The objection
narrates a sequence of motives that takes human learners through the arts and
sciences. It supplies, as it were, the narrative of motive missing from Aristotle. The motives are all of them needs. Physical needs drive us to discover
mechanical arts. The needs of the soul seek first for sciences of speech and
logic as aids in further learning. Then they turn to physical bodies and their
properties. But no knowledge of these can be had without knowledge of
quantity and figure, so that the soul is driven to seek a mathematics. Yet the
principles of mathematics are not to be found within it. They can only be had
in a higher science, which the philosophers call first philosophy or theology.
The objection wants to draw from the narrative a conclusion that the highest
science cannot have any end at all, else it would be for the sake of something
further and so subservient. Albert replies that there are internal ends and
external ends. The external end of theology is in the person knowing it. The
internal end is carried within the science itself. Thus theology is indeed, as
the objection argued, the only free science. It is sought for its own sake. It
is quite properly called 'wisdom', and it holds dominion and power over the
other sciences. Their variety is required by the multiple weaknesses of human
understanding, which needs a graded pedagogy in order to make progress
towards apprehension of the simplicity of divine truth. Thus the hierarchy of
sciences seems, from the vantage of theology, another instance of God's
condescension. God reaches down by giving grace. The philosophers may be
said to have a kind of "revelation" though the intellect's connatural light, but
the actual contemplation of what is above requires the gracious giving of

494

Faith and Philosophy

another light, which is here anticipated only by faith. 63 Without grace, the
motives of human inquiring would be cruelly unfulfilled.

4. Albert s Descriptions of the Orders
The three texts are important texts for understanding Albert on the hierarchy
of sciences, but they are no more than that. Certainly there are other important
texts, and certainly it would be possible to construct other progressions in
Albert's teaching. My point has not been to engage in unprovable intellectual
biography. I have wanted rather to illustrate how Albert responds to characteristic tensions in the Aristotelian trichotomy of sciences. He responds, I
think, by sypplying the missing narrative of the soul's ascent through the
trichotomy and then explaining the narrative theologically. But I myself have
omitted one feature of Albert's responses. I will end by retrieving it and by
suggesting that it points to a further range of tensions and difficulties.
In the last two texts discussed here, Albert includes in the narrative of
ascent a requirement that the language of teaching become more negative as
one moves higher. So, in On the Intellect, Albert quotes philosophical authorities in support of the assertion that the divine light "has no name and cannot
be told of. "64 In the Summa, Albert lays out the whole Dionysian teaching
about negative theology. To recognize that language fails more and more as
one ascends adds another reversal to the account of the hierarchy. The most
intelligible in itself is hardest for us to learn and impossible for us to describe
except by negation. But the insistence on negation must also raise serious
questions about descriptions of the hierarchy or of ascent along it.
The simple way to capture these questions is to ask where Albert is standing
when he speaks of the hierarchy. Is he at the bottom, or in the middle, or on
top, or alongside? But it can be replied immediately to this formulation of
the issue that Albert is not looking at the hierarchy. He is reading distinct,
authoritative descriptions of the hierarchy. His first task as magister is not to
describe what he sees or experiences, but to join together what he and his
students read. So the question raised by the requirement of negation for
Albert's descriptions must be put more tellingly. Do the restrictions on language in the top of the hierarchy apply equally to descriptions of the top of
the hierarchy as such? Again, is a description of the hierarchical position of
metaphysics itself subject to the strictures on metaphysical language?
Albert does not explicitly address this or related formulations of the issue.
It might seem, moreover, that he proceeds with his description as if he imagined that he possessed some neutral language outside the scientific languages
of the various stages of the hierarchy. Indeed, it might be argued that Albert
has himself here fallen victim to the confusion about the place of logic. He
might be imagining that he can evade the limitations of negative theology by
speaking merely as a logician.
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Let me suggest that Albert is rather more cunning than this argument allows. I noted at several points that his language becomes heavily charged
whenever he describes the ascent to the top of the hierarchy. The pertinent
passages of On the Intellect are filled with lyrical quotations from potent
authorities, and the corresponding parts of other treatises repeat these or tell
affecting stories of philosophical seeking. In the Summa, the reader is given
a doctrine about the rhetorical character of theology. Because theology makes
explicit the teleology of the ascent, and because it offers the only sure way
of ascending, theological language must be variously persuasive. So too are
Albert's remarks on the hierarchy of sciences. He does not offer them as
descriptions or explanations or theories, so much as exhortations. So it is he
tries from the opening of the Physics to convert the Aristotelian trichotomy
into a persuasive account of the mind's manners and motives for inquiring.
Albert is so quick to supply the missing narrative of ascent because only it
can accomplish the kind of persuasion that any responsible presentation of
the hierarchy must attempt.

University of Notre Dame
NOTES
1. Throughout this paper, I use 'science' as a place-holder in English for ·scientia'. Any
more accurate translation- such as 'body of knowledge'-would almost immediately
prove itself cumbersome and confusing.
2. This is one point worth retaining from Aniceto Fernandez-Alonso, "Scientiae et
philosophia secundum S. Albertum Magnum," Angelicum 13 (1936):24-59, at p. 25.
3. See, for example, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus 4 (lAM 37: 134.31-33).
Albert's works will be cited in one of two editions, to be noted as "Borgnet" and "lAM."
"Borgnet" refers to the Opera omnia edited by Auguste Borgnet in 38 volumes (Paris: L.
Vives, 1890-1899). "lAM" refers to the ongoing, critical edition of the Opera omnia edited
by the members of the Institutum Alberti Magni of Cologne (Munster i. W.: Aschendorff,
1951- ). The Borgnet edition will be cited by volume, page, and column; the lAM edition,
by volume, page, and line.

4. Physica 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3: 1b-2a).
5. Phys:ca 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3:2a): "nostra intentio est omnes dictas partes [sci\.
philosophiae1facere Latinis intelligibiles."
6. James A. Weisheipl, "Albert's Works on Natural Science (libri naturales) in Probable
Chronological Order," Appendix I in Weisheipl ed., Albertus Magnus and the Sciences:
Commelllorative Essays, 1980 (Toronto: PIMS, 1980),565-577.
7. For a list of these passages, and some reflections on their meaning, see James A.
Weisheipl, "Albert's Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Paraphrases," Proceedings of the PMR
Conference 5 (1980): 1-27.
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8. With 'physics' as with 'science', the reader should always hear the Latin cognate.
'Physics' means in this paper just what 'physica' means in the Albertine texts discussed.

9. Physica 1.1.1 (Borg net 3:2a).
10. Physica 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3:3a).
11. For other rehearsals of the basic trichotomy in the paraphrases, see Physica 2.1.8
(Borgnet 3:108-109), Ethica (paraphrase) 1.1.4-5, 1.3.1, and 1.4.6 (Borgnet 7:12-13, 31,
55), Metaphysica 1.1.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.6-7,2.1.4,6.1.1-3, 7.3.5 (Borgnet 6:2-3, 27, 30-32,
119-120,382-386,458), Praedicamenta 1.1-4 (Borgnet 1:2-6), Analytica Posteriora 1.1.2
(Borgnet 2:7), and Topica 1.4.2 (Borgnet 2:278). The most extended sicussion of any of
these texts is in Beroald Thomassen, Metaphysik als Lebensform: Untersuchungen zur
Grundlegung der Metaphysik im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen, BGPTM
new series 12 (Munster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1985), especially pp. 134-149. Thomassen also
provides the most complete printed bibliography of studies on the topic (pp. 178-182); I
will mention only those few that are needed in reading the three texts from Albert.
12. Physica 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3:3a-b).
13. Physica 1.1.3 (Borgnet 3:7a).
14. Physica 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3:2a): "Nihil ergo cadit in ratione mathematicorum de
materia sensibili, sed potius de materia intelligibili quae est quantitas imaginabilis .... "
15. Physica 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3:3b).
16. Physica 1.1.1 (Borgnet 3:4a). Borgnet's text reads "nullius scientiae particularis
disputatio est ad destruelltem principia," but surely the original verb must be "demonstro"
or (less probably) "construo."
17. For further discussion of this 'mirroring,' see Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic
Ontology ill Islamic and Christian Thinkers, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life &
Thought 3rd Series 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 165-180. For
a more straightforward survey of Albert's explicit remarks on the nature of logic, see
Richard F. Washell, "Logic, Language, and Albert the Great," Journal of the History of
Ideas 34 (1973):445-450.
18. Physica 1.1.5 (Borgnet 3: lOb), with the reference to the Posterior Allalytics.
19. Physica 1.1.4 (Borgnet 3: lOa).
20. Aristotle, Physics 1.1 184a 1-2.
21. Physica 1.1.5 (Borgnet 3:11a).
22. Physica 1.1.5 (Borgnet 3:11a-12b).
23. Physica 1.1.6 (Borgnet 3: 12b).
24. Physica 1.1.6 (Borgnet 3: 14b), "acceptio secundum sensum particularem tantum,"
"acceptio secundum communem simul et particularem," "acceptio secundum sensum
paticularem et communem et aliquam cC)gnitionem confusae rationis in sensu vel
cognitionis, quae loco ration is est."
25. For this and what follows to the end of the paragraph, Physica 1.1.6 (Borgnet
3: 15a-16a).
26. Praedicabilia 1.1.1-2. One can discover-or invent-a range of analogies between
the arts of the triviulIl and the trichotomy of sciences, as I did for Aquinas in Orderillg
Wisdom (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 170-179.
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27. It may also be that Albert wanted to find a place for the Ps-Aristotelian "letter" that
he mentions as his source of Book I (Borgnet 9: ). Weisheipl seems to think that the letter
is the source for the whole, but the context suggests rather that Albert is using the letter
as his guide on the question of emanation from the first cause. Compare Weisheipl,
"Albert's Works," p. 570, no. IOd.
28. There are other, more familiar formulations of the trichotomy as degrees of abstraction from matter in De intellectu, as at 2.6 (Borgnet 9:512a-513b). Because Borgnet's
version of the De intellectu seems particularly patchy, I have collated it with the manuscript
version in Milan, Bibliotheca Ambrosiana H 129 inferior, ff. IOv-20r. But I list corrections
only for one crucial passage. See note 39, below.

29. De illtellectu 1.3.2 (Borgnet 9:500a).
30. De inteilectu 1.3.3 (Borgnet 9:501a).
31. De inteilectu 2.6 (Borgnet 9:512a).
32. De illtel/ectu 2.9 (Borgnet 9:516a).
33. I combine the parallel lists towards the end of De intel/ectu 2.9 (Borgnet 9:517a,
:517b).
34. I follow the Latin version available in Opera omnia quae latina lingua conscripta
reperiri potuenlllt, ed. G. Camerarius (Paris, 1638; rptd. Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1969).
See respectively pp. 48-49, 49-53, 53-54, 56-62, and 63-64.
35. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain:
Editions Orientalistes, and Leiden: E. 1. Brill, 1968), pp. 134-153. The intellectus adeptus
and the intellectus ill effectu are juxtaposed at 150.65-67.
36. Avicenna, Liber de anima 5.6 (Van Riet 151.84-85 and 153.15-17).

37. De inteilectu 1.3.3 (Borgnet 9:50Ib).
38. De illtellectu 2.1 (Borgnet 9:503a-b).
39. De intel/ectu 2.9 (Borgnet 9:516b). In 516b, lines 2-26, I make the following
significant corrections from the manuscript (fols. 19ra-rb): for inferiorum, inferioris; for
in ordine minoris mundi, ex lumine minoris //Iundi; for et limpidius ea ponens, in li//lpidius
efficitur agens limpidior et luculentior et (7) abstrahens et; for ampliatione, applicatione.
40. De intel/ectu 2.8 (Borgnet 9:515a), with the references to Plato and Alfarabi.
41. De intel/ectu 2.10 (Borgnet 9:518a-b).
42. De intel/ectu 2.10 for Apuleius, 2.11 for Dionysius (respectively Borgnet 9:518b
and 519b).
43. De inteilectu 2.11 (Borgnet 9:520a).
44. De illteilectu 2.12 (Borgnet 9:520b).
45. De natura at origine anilllae 20.2.13 (lAM 5).
46. On the authenticity and dating of the Summa theologiae, see the editors' remarks in
the Opera omnia, lAM 34:v-xvi; and Simon Tugwell, ed., Albert alld Thomas: Selected
Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), p. 113, n. 231.
47. For a survey of some accessus patterns, see now A. 1. Minnis and A. B. Scott,
Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism, c. noo-c. 1375: The Commelltary-Tradition
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 12-36.
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48. SU1Ilma theologiae I.prologue (lAM 34: 1.5-17).
49. SUlllllla theologiae I.prologue (lAM 34:2.25-26): "planum est hanc vel solam vel
praecipuam esse scientiam."

50. Summa theologiae I.prologue (lAM 34:3.10-11): "haec etiam scientia intellectui
nostro maxime est applicabilis, et ideo in ipsa maxime quiescit anima."
51. The phrase first occurs in SUlIlma theologiae 1.1.1 ad I (lAM 34:6.61), then recurs
at 1.1.2 corpus (34:8.47-48), 1.3.3 [objection 3] (34: 13.46), and 1.1.5.1 ad 1 (34: 16.3738).
52. Summa theologiae 1.1.1 ad 1 (lAM 34:6.62): "informans ad fidem et meritum
operum."

53. SUlllma theologiae 1.1.1 ad 1 (lAM 34:7.4-5): "potentia universalia." Albert dismisses as irrelevant an argument for theology's universality based on four senses of
"universal" (34:7.11-29).
54. Albert seems to take the distinction from the first chapters of Augustine's De
doctrina Christiana I; see especially Summa theologiae 1.1.3.1 (lAM 34:9.70-10.20).
55. See, for example, SUlllma theologiae 1.1.3.1 ad 3 (lAM 34: 11 ,25-26), "utile esse
significando vel disponendo ad id quo fruendum est;" 1.1.3.2 corpus (34: 13.2-3), "in utili
quaeritur fruibile et stat sub fonna fruibilis;" 1.1.3.3 corpus (34: 13.60-61), "verum in re
fruibili vel utili;" 1.1.3.4 corpus (34: 14.31-32), "per formam analogiae ad id quo fruendum
est;" 1.1.4 corpus (34: 15.22-23), "subiectum est fruibile vel relatum ad ipsum per modum
signi vel utilis;" and 1.1.4 ad 5 (34: 15.60), "In ista autem scientia tractantur secundum
relationem ad fruibile .... "
56. Albert here draws on traditional lists of the modi or manners of speech in Scripture.
He himself mentions nine lIIodi: exemplary, preceptive, revelatory, hymnic, oratorical,
parabolic, disputative, admonitory, and hortatory (SulIlma theologiae 1.1.5.4 [objection
13], lAM 34:21.25-41).
57. Albert's language is cautious on this point. He says that theology may use material
images "properly according to its own manner as if they were poetic things" ("talibus
quasi poeticis utitur proprie secundum suum modum," SUlIlma theologiae 1.1.5 ad 2 [lAM
34: 17.11-12]). Again, theology "uses poetic things formed and figured by divine wisdom"
("poeticis utitur ex divina sa pi entia formatis et figuratis," 1.1.5.2 ad 1 [34: 18.12-13]).
Elsewhere he says simply that is "proceeds poetically" ("poetice procedit," 1.1.5.1 objection I (34: 16.24]).
58. Summa theologiae 1.1.5.4 ad 6 (lAM 34:21.76-79), with reference to Nicomachean
Ethics 10.9 I 179b4-21. Albert may be generalizing Aristotle's point. Aristotle emphasizes
a distinction between the few and the many, and Albert too begins his reply by alluding
to such a distinction. But it seems to disappear when Albert gets to the limits on persuasion.
It seems for Albert that all human beings need to be treated as weak learners by the divine
teaching.
59. Summa theologiae 1.1.5.4 ad 13 (lAM 34:22.71-86).
60. SUlllllla theologiae 1.1.5.1 objection I (lAM 34: 16.25), "sub integumentis
metaphoricis," paraphrasing Celestial Hierarchy 2; 1.1.5.1 ad 2 (34: 17.3-4), "velaminum
circumvalentum," quoting Celestial Hierarchy 1.
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61. Summa theologiae 1.1.5.1 ad 2 (lAM 34:17.22-31), quoting Celestial Hierarchy 1.
Note especially the phrase "materia lis manuductio."
62. SUlllma theologiae 1.1.6 objection 3 (lAM 34:23.22-49). The source cited is Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2 982b29-30, but Aristotle provides no more than the tag-line that
human nature is enslaved in many ways.
63. SU11lma theologiae 1.1.4 ad 3 (lAM 34: 15.41-50).
64. De intel/ectu 2.9 (Borgnet 9:517a).

